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ABSTRACT 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means (1932) remains one of the most cited works in 
management studies. Our paper shows that Berle and Means espoused a 
stakeholder theory of corporate governance that challenged the then-
hegemonic idea that the sole purpose of a corporation is to create value for 
the shareholders. We argue that Berle and Means’s support for stakeholder 
theory can be associated with their earlier service in the U.S. military, an 
organization which then inculcated an ethos of public service in its 
members. Our paper, which is based on archival research in the Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library, seeks to relate changes in how U.S. 
military organizations have structured themselves with contemporaneous 
changes in the organization of private-sector firms. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper will advance our understanding of the evolution of U.S. 
ideologies of corporate governance by examining the circumstances that 
surrounded the writing of The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. Other researchers have argued that 
this influential book promoted “managerialism,” the philosophy of 
corporate governance that dominated U.S. business life from the 1930s to 
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the 1970s.1 Managerialism held that executives ought to take the interests 
of a wide range of stakeholders, not just shareholders, into account when 
making decisions.2 Managerialism was different from both post-1980 
shareholder-value ideology and the philosophy that informed U.S. 
corporate governance prior to the New Deal: from roughly the 1830s to 
the 1930s, the dominant view in the United States was that business 
corporations existed solely to maximize shareholder value.3 According to 
scholars such as Roger Martin and Lynn Stout, the rise of managerialism 
around the time of the New Deal encouraged a generation of U.S. 
managers to share the benefits of rising productivity with workers. The 
result was a remarkable period of shared prosperity in the thirty or so years 
after 1945.4 Martin, Stout, and other authors have connected the well-
documented post-1980 rise in levels of income inequality in the United 
States to the displacement of Berle–Means managerialism by the renascent 
ideology of shareholder value.5 
Why does our re-examination of Berle, Means, and their book 
matter? The research discussed in the previous paragraphs suggests why 
the study of business ideas and business books can be important: most 
business books have zero influence on the real world, but some texts, of 
which The Modern Corporation and Private Property is a prime example, 
do help to change the prevailing ideology of corporate governance, thereby 
changing millions of lives. 
Ideas have consequences. In view of the importance of this text to 
the history of American business in the twentieth century, it is surely 
worthy to investigate the motives of its authors. It is hoped that our paper 
will be read by legal scholars, corporate governance researchers, business 
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historians, and other academics. Moreover, we are convinced that the re-
discovery of the philosophy of Berle and Means is of genuine social 
importance. Therefore, we hope to raise awareness of the more radical 
aspects of their ideas among thoughtful practitioners to encourage 
reflection on the excesses of the post-1980 period of shareholder primacy. 
Some readers may be skeptical of our claim that the ideas of Berle 
and Means are still relevant. We concede that there are many differences 
between our time and the context in which Berle and Means wrote, in 
which the Managerial Revolution (i.e., the transformation of the American 
economy by the rise of the large oligopolistic corporations managed by 
non-proprietor managers) was then a very recent phenomenon.6 Today, we 
are used to the dominance of many industries by a few firms owned by 
absentee shareholders.7 The lengthy sections of the book by Berle and 
Means devoted to explaining such then-novel phenomena as the separation 
of management and control therefore strike the twenty-first century reader 
as both superfluous and quaint. We are nevertheless convinced that the 
prescriptive ideas of Berle and Means are highly relevant to today’s 
debates about inequality, corporate governance, and the social 
responsibilities of companies. Berle and Means tackled what is still the 
most important question in corporate governance: In whose interests 
should for-profit corporations be managed? At a time when many 
Americans are once again debating issues related to corporate governance, 
executive compensation, and whether managers have duties beyond 
maximizing returns for shareholders, we believe that an exploration of the 
historical origins of Berle and Means’s seminal text is timely.8 Indeed, re-
engaging with Berle and Means’s call for business executives to behave in 
a public-spirited fashion is particularly important in the light of the 
emergence of political movements and national leaders who 
simultaneously celebrate the robust pursuit of self-interest in business 
contexts while claiming to honor the public-service ethos of members of 
the military. 
We now progress to a literature review which looks at how previous 
authors have viewed the motives of Berle and Means before detailing how 
the project to write The Modern Corporation and Private Property took 
shape. We argue that Berle and Means’s military service influenced their 
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thinking. We discuss the reception and impact of the book and then 
consider how and why the influence of the book declined after around 
1970 as Chicago School ideas came to influence U.S. corporate 
governance, displacing Berle–Means managerialism. We show that the 
result was a resurgence of the shareholder primacy principle that Berle and 
Means opposed. We conclude our paper by arguing that the book remains 
highly relevant today, when Americans are once again debating whether 
the business corporation has any purpose besides the maximization of 
shareholder value. 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW:  
PERSPECTIVES ON THE MOTIVES OF BERLE AND MEANS 
The existing literature on the rise and fall of managerialism has 
clearly established the importance of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property in shaping U.S. business thought and practice in the 
period from the 1930s to the late 1970s.9 In 1992, a distinguished legal 
academic noted that The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
shaped the thinking of “an entire generation.”10 Unfortunately, these 
authors have neither examined the immediate context in which Berle and 
Means wrote their seminal text nor reflected on the motives of the authors. 
One of the few to discuss the authorial motivation behind the book is the 
Marxist scholar Richard Marens, who regards the publication of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property as part of a broader Corporate 
Social Responsibility movement.11 For Marens, corporate social 
responsibility was a tactic used by the American corporate elite to preserve 
its autonomy. This would help them resist increasing labor militancy and 
growing demands for government regulation in the context of the Great 
Depression. 
We profoundly disagree with Marens’s cynical contention that The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property and “business liberalism” more 
generally was simply a defensive move by U.S. corporations to preempt 
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demands for more radical economic reforms. Marens overlooks the fact 
that Berle and Means had an interest in the social responsibilities of 
corporate managers that predates American capitalism’s existential crisis 
in the winter of 1932–1933. The chronology of the manuscript’s 
composition does not fit Marens’s argument, since we know from Berle’s 
papers that the book was completed by 1931.12 Moreover, it is inaccurate 
to describe Berle and Means as the tools of the corporate elite when 
powerful business interests actually attempted to suppress the publication 
of this book. 
We are more sympathetic to Christian Christiansen’s view that Berle 
and Means’s advocacy of a “socialized, public-oriented corporation” was 
a profound challenge to the ethos of “free-market liberalism.”13 We also 
agree with Howard Brick’s view that there are some affinities between the 
stakeholder view presented by Berle and Means and the “war-inspired 
aspirations” for “industrial or economic democracy” that led to the 
creation of the “League for Industrial Democracy” in 1921.14 
Indeed, we concur with Brick and see the legacy of the Great War as 
crucial to our understanding of the book’s origins. During the war, which 
was fought in the name of making the world safe for democracy, proposals 
for workplace democracy in the form of works councils and employee 
representation on boards were energetically debated in the United States 
and other Entente countries. During the First World War, John D. 
Rockefeller Jr. became a proponent of worker representation in corporate 
governance through elected worker representatives.15 American observers, 
such as Berle, observed how workers’ councils, or “soviets,” seized 
control of factories in Russia in 1917.16 The Great War saw the creation of 
works councils in shipyards and other U.S. workplaces. By 1922 there 
were at least 725 works councils in the United States.17 Although 
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Germany, rather than the United States, would eventually become the 
nation most closely associated with workplace democracy,18 our 
knowledge of this subsequent development should not blind us to the fact 
that interest in workplace democracy was strong in early twentieth century 
America. 
The Great War debate over industrial democracy, along with the 
1916 to 1919 court battle between Henry Ford and his investors,19 raised 
the fundamental issue of whose interests corporations ought to be 
governed for: either only the shareholders or the shareholders along with 
other participating stakeholders, including workers. Although Berle and 
Means did not touch on the issue of the inclusion of workers in corporate 
governance in their 1933 book, they shared the belief of workplace 
democracy, advocating that managers had a moral obligation to consider 
the interests of workers as well as shareholders in making corporate 
strategy, as we show below. 
We argue that the stakeholder model of corporate governance Berle 
and Means presented in their book was influenced by their experiences 
during the First World War. Their book represents an attempt to introduce 
into the business world the ethos of professionalism and disinterested 
public service that characterized the U.S. Army’s officer corps. In most 
modern professional armies, the dominant ethos is one of altruism and 
devotion to the national interest: individuals are expected to serve the 
nation selflessly and at modest rates of pay. In the peacetime private 
sector, in contrast, the profit motive is accepted, and the prevailing ethos 
holds that it is legitimate for executives, shareholders, and other actors to 
maximize their own economic interest. The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property was an exhortation to American managers to emulate the 
ethos of military officers by putting country before self and prioritizing the 
interests of the nation over those of shareholders and executives. 
We also argue that the Berle–Means version of stakeholder theory 
was a paternalist one in which senior managers were to expect 
unconditional obedience from subordinates in the same way that early 
twentieth century U.S. military commanders expected soldiers to respect 
the chain of command. There has long been a two-way exchange of ideas 
between the corporate world and the military. At various points in its 
history, the militaries of the United States and other capitalist countries 
have borrowed organizational techniques developed by managers in the 
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private sector. For instance, management tools developed by civilian 
railway executives coordinated Allied supply lines on the Western Front 
during the First World War.20 As Shamir has shown, ideas about scientific 
management taken from large U.S. companies have long influenced U.S. 
military doctrine.21 This process was famously illustrated by Robert S. 
McNamara’s attempt to manage the Vietnam War using techniques that 
had previously worked for him at the Ford Motor Company.22 There is a 
somewhat smaller body of literature on how military managerial 
innovations flowed in the opposite direction, namely from the armed 
forces to the private sector. For instance, the influence of the military on 
the history of American management is a theme that was developed by 
Keith Hoskin and Richard Macve in their study of the business careers of 
graduates from the United States Military Academy, West Point, who 
brought military organizational techniques into the private sector.23 While 
we know about specific managerial techniques that have moved between 
the military and the private sector, the impact of militarization and the 
military ethos on the evolution of U.S. corporate governance remains a 
woefully under-researched topic. 
In his pioneering study of the displacement of managerialism by 
shareholder value ideology after the 1970s, Brian Cheffins asserts that the 
formative experience of military service during the Second World War 
influenced the behavior of corporate executives in the 1950s and 1960s.24 
For Cheffins, the replacement of this cohort by younger men who had 
largely been spared military service helps to explain the rise of shareholder 
value ideology in the 1980s; he writes that that the military ethos of service 
to the collective was one of the “factors that helped to keep top 
management on the straight and narrow during the managerial capitalism 
era [i.e., between the 1930s and the 1970s] . . . . Values such as duty, 
honesty, service, and responsibility that were fostered under the testing 
conditions of the Great Depression and World War II likely contributed to 
a sense of moral restraint among mid-twentieth-century executives.”25 
Unfortunately, Cheffins did not develop this insight, which was supported 
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primarily by a citation of Sobel’s celebratory history of the “Greatest 
Generation.”26 
The sociological term Greatest Generation, which is conventionally 
applied to Americans born between 1901 and 1927, has recently appeared 
in non-scholarly works that contrast the imagined virtues of this generation 
with the selfishness of the Baby Boomers.27 Professor Cheffins is careful 
not to romanticize U.S. corporate governance in the managerialist era, 
noting that executives of the so-called Greatest Generation were 
responsible for such debacles as the bankruptcy of Penn Central in 1970.28 
He points out that such managerial failures ultimately served to discredit 
managerialism and thus pave the way for the rise of shareholder-value 
ideology. 
While Cheffins prudently qualifies his comments, linking 
managerialism with the Greatest Generation’s formative experience of 
military service, he nevertheless associates a higher level of patriotism to 
the willingness of managerialism-era managers to consider the interests of 
non-shareholder stakeholders. 
We agree with Cheffins that there was likely a causal linkage 
between the patriotism manifested in military service and the willingness 
of U.S. executives of the managerialist era to subordinate the interests of 
shareholders to those of workers and other stakeholders. However, we feel 
that more empirical research and conceptual clarity about military 
patriotism and corporate patriotism is required. 
II. MILITARY SERVICE AND CULTURES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
We would regard it as a serious fallacy to maintain that an executive 
will be more likely to adopt an ethos of public service in a subsequent 
business career than would otherwise have been the case just because that 
executive once served in the uniform of some military force. In our view, 
the crucial variable is the ethos that pervades the culture of the particular 
military organization in which the future executive is socialized. Not all 
armed forces promote service to the collective as a moral ideal, and some 
militaries have organizational culture that permit the pursuit of financial 
self-interest by leaders. In our view, military organizations can be placed 
on a spectrum that extends from those that operate on a pure version of 
agency theory, in which leaders are motivated financially, to ones in which 
an altruistic desire to serve the collective (e.g., the nation-state) is 
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inculcated in all members. A future executive who has served in the latter 
type of military organization would be, in our view, far more likely to 
believe that managers ought to prioritize the interests of the wider 
community over those of themselves and the shareholders. Berle and 
Means served in such a military force. 
The historical record shows that armed forces have occupied 
different points on this spectrum, using a mixture of material rewards (e.g., 
cash bonuses) and patriotic appeals to serve the nation to motivate 
personnel to exert themselves. For instance, the Royal Navy prior to 1815 
and the British Army in the pre-1868 era of purchased commissions are 
outstanding historical examples of armed forces that relied heavily on 
financial incentives in the course of motivating their multinational 
workforces to perform risky tasks.29 In the early modern period, the use of 
mercenaries with no regard to their nationality was common—the 
powerful Spanish, Swedish, and French Empires of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries relied to a large extent on forces recruited from 
poorer parts of Europe, including Germany, Switzerland, and the British 
Isles.30 In the eighteenth century, the link between military units and 
nation-states became somewhat stronger, but the careers of officers 
continued to take them across borders, and buying a regiment could be a 
profitable investment for a military entrepreneur. In this context, there was 
often no pretense that either the officer or the ordinary soldiers were 
motivated by patriotism.31 Such forces were thus similar to present-day, 
for-profit military companies such as Academic (formerly Blackwater), 
which also rely on financial incentives rather than patriotism to motivate 
members.32   
Berle and Means, in contrast, did their military service in an armed 
force that had a public-spirited ethos rather than a profit-seeking one. For 
context, it should be explained that in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution, many countries abandoned the use of mercenaries and 
financial incentives for enlistment and performance in favor of appeals 
based on patriotism.33 There was a profound change in military culture and 
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motives for military service in all Western countries,34 with the officer 
corps of Revolutionary France and Prussia being among the first in the 
Western world to experience professionalization and the demise of the 
older model of military leadership in which the profit motive had been 
considered legitimate.35 This professional ethos became dominant in the 
U.S. officer corps over the course of the nineteenth century thanks to the 
efforts of U.S. military reformers who admired the professionalism and 
public-service ethos of the French and Prussian officer classes.36 The result 
of the efforts of these reformers was that the U.S. military promoted a non-
commercial ethos that contrasted with the acceptance of the profit-motive 
so evident in other spheres of American life.37 References to financial 
incentives are conspicuously absent from the motto of West Point (“Duty, 
Honor, Country”) created in 1802. 
One of the results of the cultural shift effected by the reformers was 
that U.S. military recruitment in the First World War did not rely on cash 
incentives, in sharp contrast to the American Civil War. There, military 
work had been structured via a quasi-market whereby rich men were able 
to pay poor men to take their places.38 In a parallel development, the U.S. 
military had, by the early twentieth century, dispensed with financial 
incentives as a means of incentivizing officers to exert themselves on the 
battlefield. The so-called “salary revolution” of the nineteenth century had 
resulted in the placement of all officers on modest salaries. Whereas 
officers in the colonial and early national periods were rewarded with 
performance bonuses, American officers of the early twentieth century 
were expected to serve for love of country, not for profit.39 It was into the 
military culture that had been created by these reformers that Berle and 
Means were inducted in 1917. In our view, the service-before-self culture 
of the U.S. officer corps of the First World War era shaped the thinking of 
Berle and Means about the social responsibilities of business executives. 
III. THE BACKGROUND OF THE MODERN CORPORATION  
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
The radicalism of the 1932 book by Berle and Means becomes 
evident when compared against either the shareholder-centric theory that 
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informed the court’s 1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., or the 
shareholder-centric view of the corporation that has dominated American 
managerial practice and corporate law since approximately 1980. We 
therefore agree with the view of R. Edward Freeman et al., that Adolf Berle 
advanced an important precursor of the stakeholder theory of corporate 
governance.40 The communitarian ethos that underpins the stakeholder 
model of Berle and Means is seen in their call for a “wholly new concept 
of corporate activity” in which “neither the claims of ownership nor those 
of control can stand against the paramount interests of the community” in 
the making of corporate strategy. They argued that the goals of CEOs and 
other senior corporate managers should be to deliver “fair wages, security 
to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of 
business.” Berle and Means said that this program would inevitably divert 
a portion of the wealth created by firms from the shareholders to other 
stakeholders. For capitalism to survive and become more humane, it was 
essential that “the interests of passive property owners” (i.e., shareholders) 
should “give way” to the moral “claims by various groups in the 
community.”41 
It is tempting to attribute the radicalism of this book to the fact it was 
released in early 1933 (the very trough of the Great Depression) when 
unemployment was at record levels, industry was paralyzed, and it 
appeared that the survival of capitalism itself was in doubt.42 However, we 
should remember that Berle and Means wrote the manuscript of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property well before this point, in the 
period 1927 to 1931.43 As late as the end of 1930, many observers still 
thought that the recent Wall Street equities crash would have a limited 
impact on the real economy, a widespread and false belief made possible 
by the poor state of macroeconomic data in that era.44 Until the 
Kreditanstalt crisis of May 1931, it was not clear to contemporaries that 
the United States was heading for a severe crisis rather than simply a mild 
recession.45 Thus, when Berle and Means were composing their book, the 
country had not yet reached a crisis that undermined the legitimacy of 
capitalism itself. 
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Rather than seeing the book as primarily a response to the Crash of 
1929, we argue that the thinking of Berle and Means was profoundly 
influenced by the militarization of U.S. society during the Great War; 
indeed, the co-authors first met during their basic military training in 
1917.46 As Capozzola has noted, World War I had a profound impact on 
American culture and thinking about the nature of the individual’s 
obligation to the collective: the 1917 Selective Service Act was the 
“centerpiece” of obligations associated with citizenship during wartime.47 
In 1916, the United States, which had traditionally spent little on its 
military relative to other Western countries,48 suddenly began allocating 
massive resources to the military, paving the way for the nation’s eventual 
transformation into a military superpower. By many metrics, the United 
States in 1914 was a relatively demilitarized society, at least in comparison 
to the European states, but within a few years, the armed forces had 
developed a pervasive role in national life that endures to this day.49 As 
we show below, military themes run through their 1933 magnum opus as 
Berle and Means attempted to extend to the business world the ethos of 
professionalism and disinterested public service that had earlier come to 
inform the thinking of members of the United States Army officer corps. 
Khurana argues that the managerialist philosophy that animated 
Berle and Means and other early twentieth century American business 
reformers and educators was deeply rooted in two American institutions: 
the socially reformist version of Christianity taught in the mainline 
Protestant denominations and the U.S. military.50 According to Khurana, 
a variant of liberal Protestantism later drove some Progressives to seek to 
replace the chaos of the unregulated market with a social order in which 
disinterested experts such as medical doctors and civil servants displaced 
the profit-motive in the allocation of scarce resources. This elitist and 
utopian ideology, which was connected to movements such as Prohibition 
and eugenics, informed the creation of the Harvard Business School (HBS) 
in 1908 and the move to make management into a profession, curated by 
insider gatekeepers, similar to medicine and the law. In 1926, HBS Dean 
Wallace B. Donham declared that the aim of the school was to produce a 
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generation of socially minded business men who would reform American 
capitalism from within corporations.51 
Khurana also compares the ideologies that have been taught in elite 
U.S. business schools in various historical periods with the professional 
ethos that has consistently been cultivated by West Point since 1802. In 
the officer corps of the United States and other modern nation-states, 
honor is defined in relation to public service. While not necessarily anti-
commercial, this military ethos is radically non-commercial.52 It is, 
therefore, diametrically opposed to the rational-actor model and agency 
theory, the theories of human behavior that have been dominant in 
business schools since the late 1970s.53 Army officers who dedicate 
themselves to the profession of arms do not do so for material reasons.54 
For instance, there are no cash performance bonuses or stock options for 
dragging a wounded comrade to safety. Instead, in modern, post-French 
Revolution armed forces, non-financial rewards such as the Iron Cross, the 
Victoria Cross, and Congressional Medal of Honor shape the culture of 
the military.55 
Our reading of The Modern Corporation and Private Property has 
not revealed the impress of the liberal Protestant ideas discussed by 
Khurana. However, we do find references to war, particularly the legacies 
of the First World War, in this text. In many ways, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property can be viewed as an example of a post-
war work written by authors whose lives were transformed by the Great 
War. The variant of the stakeholder model of capitalism advocated by 
Berle and Means was congruent with the modern military ethos because it 
held that the key decision-makers in business organizations should be 
motivated by the public interest, not personal financial gain. 
IV. THE MAKING OF THE MODERN CORPORATION  
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
Born in 1895, Berle completed A.B. and M.A. degrees at Harvard 
College before entering Harvard Law School in 1914. The United States 
did not enter the war until April 1917, but American society was divided 
by the war as soon as it started in August 1914. These divisions were 
partially ethnic, with many German- and Irish-Americans opposing 
American entry into the conflict, but the divisions were also related to 
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region and social class. While many Anglophile upper-class New 
Englanders instinctively favored the British from the outset, Berle, who 
was of partly German ancestry, declared that he was indifferent to whether 
“the Hohenzollerns” or “the French entrenched interests behind 
Clemenceau and so forth were to be the masters of Europe.” Since 
“Harvard declared war in 1914, right off the bat,” Berle’s time at college 
was “a rather bitter period.” Berle enlisted in 1917 despite his reservations 
about President Wilson’s decision to abandon neutrality by declaring war 
on Germany. He did his military training in Plattsburg, New York, where 
he met Means, his future co-author. The two men ended up sharing a bunk 
bed. Gardiner Means came from a broadly similar social background and 
was also the son of a minister. Means was intellectually gifted and entered 
Harvard when he was eighteen to study chemistry.56 
The war interrupted their career plans. The site of their officer 
training was culturally significant, as the Plattsburg Barracks were the 
epicenter of the so-called “Plattsburg Movement,” a social movement that 
had begun in 1912. This movement sought to promote the altruistic moral 
ideals associated with military service among American businessmen: 
businessmen who were reserve officers would run their companies with 
the public interest rather than the profit motive in mind. Private donors 
who supported this ideal had funded a training camp for would-be officers 
in Plattsburg that was dubbed the “businessmen’s camp.”57 The key idea 
among the proponents of the Plattsburg Movement was that modern 
America was too selfish, too driven by the profit motive, and that business 
leaders needed to give back to the community through unpaid military 
service on weekends and during the summer months. In effect, the 
Plattsburg Movement was about promoting a non-commercial ethos 
among the American business class. 
By the time Berle and Means had enlisted, officer-training camps 
modelled on Plattsburg had been opened across the United States thanks 
to the efforts of General Leonard Wood, a military man with center-left 
political views, and former President Theodore Roosevelt. In 1912, 
Roosevelt ran for the presidency as a third-party candidate on a so-called 
“New Nationalism” platform, which included increased military spending 
and a variety of progressive reforms that frightened the pro-business 
faction of the Republican Party.58 Wood’s progressive beliefs, which 
brought him into conflict with U.S. business interests during the military 
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occupation of Cuba, informed his approach to military reform and left a 
lasting influence on U.S. Army culture. Today, U.S. military men are often 
stereotyped as monolithically pro-business and politically conservative: 
Wood and his many allies in the Progressive-era armed forces help us to 
refute this common idea, since they advocated government limitations on 
the profit-making activities of firms.59 
 Soon after he was commissioned, Berle was transferred into 
Intelligence and served in the Dominican Republic. There, he applied his 
legal skills in clearing the land titles for the South Puerto Rico Sugar 
Company as part of a wartime effort to increase sugar production for U.S. 
consumers. He was then posted to the Versailles Peace Conference where 
he joined the American delegation as an aide to his former professor, 
Robert Lord of Harvard. Berle’s “worm’s eye view” of the conference had 
a profound impact on him. He recounted how he was initially “carried 
away” by the idealism of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. At Versailles, Berle 
worked on a committee that focused on the new Baltic republics, and this 
led him to meet John Maynard Keynes.60 
The First World War also expanded the intellectual horizons of 
Means. After basic training at Plattsburgh, where he met Berle, Means was 
accepted into aeronautics training, but an unfortunate crash ended his 
hopes of becoming a pilot. In the immediate postwar period, Means 
traveled to Turkey to assist American aid efforts. There, he had the 
opportunity to observe how the trade in carpets was conducted in a 
radically different cultural context. Means’s interest in the industry was 
sparked by his experience in Turkey, where he established a textile 
manufacturing company soon after his demobilization.61   
After his return to the United States, Berle practiced corporate law, 
co-founding his own practice in 1924, and taught finance at HBS from 
1925 onward.62 Berle began his teachings by publishing about corporate 
governance in Columbia Law Review and Harvard Law Review. His 
growing stature as an expert on corporations led the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica to ask him in 1928 to write the entry for “Corporation” in a new 
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edition.63 Berle’s ideas about corporate governance were shaped by other 
Americans who were interested in limiting what they saw as the excessive 
selfishness of current business leaders. Berle’s earliest publications on 
corporations had brought him to the attention of William Ripley, the 
Harvard economics professor who had published Main Street and Wall 
Street in 1927. Ripley had, in turn, been influenced by Louis Brandeis’s 
1914 book Other People’s Money and Thorstein Veblen’s 1923 book 
Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise. Brandeis was a crusading 
lawyer who was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Wilson in 
1916, while Veblen was an institutional economist whose radical views 
had cost him several academic appointments.64 
Drawing on the iconoclastic ideas of Veblen and Brandeis as well as 
his own research, Ripley identified a huge expansion in both the number 
and value of corporations since the outbreak of the First World War.65 In 
the 1920s, some progressive businessmen were moving away from 
shareholder primacy towards the view that managers ought to consider the 
interests of other stakeholders. For instance, this idea was endorsed by 
Robert Brookings, a businessman and philanthropist.66 Owen Young, first 
chairman of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), said in a 1927 HBS 
address, “I hope the day may come when these great business 
organizations will truly belong to the men who are giving their lives and 
their efforts to them. I care not in what capacity.”67 Berle and Means were 
thus part of a community of scholars and practitioners who were interested 
in challenging the idea that the primary or sole purpose of a corporation 
was to maximize the return on the shareholders’ investment. 
Ripley was involved with the Social Science Research Council and 
the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation. He helped Berle submit a 
proposal to study corporations, which resulted in a $7,000 grant.68 Berle 
left his part-time teaching job at Harvard Law School in fall 1927, taking 
his grant to Columbia Law School.69 Berle then recruited his Plattsburg 
training camp “bunkmate,” Gardiner Means, who was then pursuing a 
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Ph.D. at Harvard, as his research assistant.70 The research project, which 
took four years to complete (1927 to 1931), culminated in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property. Berle said that he felt that Means 
should have his name on the title page “because he had contributed so 
much.”71 
The 1929 Wall Street crash happened partway through Berle’s 
research project. Although their offices were uptown at Columbia 
University, the business connections of Berle and Means meant that they 
were well positioned to observe both Wall Street’s reaction to the crisis 
and the ensuing national debate about the social function of corporate 
finance. Berle knew that the law firms that served Wall Street companies 
had intensely disliked Ripley’s book Main Street and Wall Street. Berle 
later recalled the following: 
[Established law firms] officially disapproved of it, and officially 
said so, but a good many of the men in them came to see me, came to 
see Ripley—that’s why he was invited to speak at the State Bar 
Association—to say, “Now it seems you have a point.” And some of 
them went as far as saying, “There is going to be a smash up here. 
Something has got to give. This has become far too dangerous 
[activity on Wall Street] for serious people.”72 
The initial reaction of Wall Street to the ideas of Berle and Means 
were also primarily negative. The Corporation Trust Company, founded 
in 1892, owned the Commerce Clearing House, which published a range 
of business books. Speaking in 1969, Berle recalled that the Corporation 
Trust Company attempted to force their book’s original publisher, the 
Commerce Clearing House of Chicago, to “find some way of dumping it 
quietly.”73 He added that “it therefore came just this side of being 
suppressed by the then existent financial establishment.” Berle also 
recalled in 1969 that “though we didn’t know it then, we were pounding 
out the principles which later became principles on which the Securities 
and Exchange Legislation enforced today is based.”74 An unnamed 
individual at GM—perhaps chairman Alfred Sloan—read a summary of 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property and was deeply 
offended.75 The Corporation Trust Company, fearing the loss of GM’s 
business, attempted to suppress the book. Luckily for Berle and Means, 
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the staff of the Commerce Clearing House did not destroy the publishing 
plates and instead sold them to Macmillan and Company, which re-
published the book in February 1933.76   
The Modern Corporation and Private Property may have infuriated 
many on Wall Street, but it was critically praised within the academic 
community. The political scientist George Ward Stocking wrote that Berle 
and Means had “rendered a service to the science of economics which no 
economist can afford to overlook.”77 The book raised Berle’s profile, 
bringing him into contact with New York State Governor Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (FDR), who was just about to become President. There is no 
archival evidence that FDR personally read The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property.78 Nonetheless, Berle became part of FDR’s brain trust 
and provided the President with advice about finance and banking 
reform.79 Berle also advised FDR’s Labor Secretary, Frances Perkins.80 
Means’s contribution to the New Deal came largely as a result of his 
work as an advisor to Agriculture Secretary Henry A. Wallace, the most 
left-wing of FDR’s cabinet members. In 1936, Means published The 
Modern Economy in Action, a book co-authored with his wife, the 
historian Caroline F. Ware. This work, which distinguished the “new 
economy” dominated by large corporations from the “old economy” based 
on free enterprise, reiterated the argument of Berle and Means, that the rise 
of the large corporation had represented a revolutionary change in the U.S. 
economy. As the Second World War approached, Berle and Means 
continued to work in public service, although their focus shifted to foreign 
policy. As Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs from 
1938 to 1944, Berle was one of the architects of FDR’s “Good Neighbor 
Policy,” a diplomatic effort aimed at securing the support of Latin 
American nations by distancing the U.S. government from the excesses 
perpetrated by U.S. corporate interests in the region.81 
Under previous Republican administrations, the U.S. government 
had largely been seen as the tool of U.S. firms, such as United Fruit. Berle 
believed that restraining U.S. firms rather than championing their interests 
in all cases would best secure the long-term interests of the United States 
                                                     
 76. We have cited page numbers in the 1933 version of the book. 
 77. George W. Stocking, The Modern Corporation and Private Property by A.A. Berle Jr., and 
Gardiner C. Means, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 1933, at 214 (book review). 
 78. THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS AND THEIR 
LEGACIES, 1933–1993, at 16 (1997). 
 79. Letters from Franklin Roosevelt to Adolf Berle (Apr. 23, 1934 & Sept. 13, 1934) (on file 
with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Adolf Berle Papers, Box 10, File: Roosevelt, 
Franklin D). 
 80. Letter from Adolf Berle to Frances Perkins (Mar. 22, 1934) (on file with the Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library, Adolf Berle Papers, File: Pa–Ph). 
 81. CAROLINE WARE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN ECONOMY IN ACTION 141 (1936). 
2019] Military Roots of a Stakeholder Model  553 
and its corporations. Berle’s approach to foreign policy was thus congruent 
with his support of the domestic policies associated with the New Deal. 
During, and immediately after the Second World War, Berle worked with 
likeminded liberal internationalists, such as Dean Acheson, to reshape 
U.S. foreign policy in keeping with this theory of enlightened self-interest. 
As an elder statesman, Berle advised President Kennedy about U.S. policy 
in the region, again urging a policy of enlightened self-interest in which 
the U.S. government would sacrifice the short-term needs of particular 
corporate interests to win the hearts and minds in the region.82 
Means also served in Washington during the New Deal and wartime 
eras. He worked as an advisor to Agriculture Secretary Henry A. Wallace 
and a variety of federal agencies before leaving the Government to do 
research for the Committee for Economic Development. After 1952, 
Means worked for the Fund for the Republic, a left-leaning organization 
that provided legal services to the targets of McCarthyism, which had 
received financial backing from Henry Ford II and other progressive 
businessmen.83 
V. EVIDENCE OF THE INFLUENCE OF MILITARY-DERIVED IDEAS  
ON THE THINKING OF BERLE AND MEANS 
Our reading of The Modern Corporation and Private Property has 
not revealed much evidence of the Social Gospel or liberal Protestant ideas 
that Khurana regards as having driven many early twentieth century U.S. 
business reformers to try to limit the pursuit of self-interest. Berle and 
Means mention religion only three times in the text, and in all of these 
instances they do so in the course of analogizing the concentration of 
economic power in the hands of unaccountable corporate executives to the 
hierarchical power structures of the Catholic Church.84 A particular 
comparison was the practice of CEOs handpicking the boards to which 
they are nominally subordinate to “the organization which dominates the 
Catholic Church. The Pope selects the Cardinals and the College of 
Cardinals in turn select the succeeding Pope.”85 The use of this example 
may have been an attempt by the authors to play to the prejudices of 
Protestant readers who had been socialized to prefer the more 
decentralized, grassroots governance systems of American Protestantism. 
Beyond that, however, we find no explicit references or even allusions to 
                                                     
 82. KYLE LONGLEY, IN THE EAGLE’S SHADOW: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA 175–
76 (2002). 
 83. See WARREN J. SAMUELS & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, GARDINER C. MEANS, INSTITUTIONALIST 
AND POST KEYNESIAN (1990). 
 84. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 88, 352, 357. 
 85. Id. at 88. 
554 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:535 
religious themes in the book. The authors neither refer to those sections of 
the New Testament that condemn avarice or the profit motive nor cite 
Walter Rauschenbusch and the other Social Gospel theologians who had 
used these passages to argue for socialist policies.86 The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property is an essentially secular book, albeit 
one with an ethos that is congruent with the Social Gospel. 
In our view, the influence of war and militarization on this text is 
much greater than that of religion. At the start of the book, Berle and 
Means cite Die Neue Wirtschaft, a 1918 essay by Walther Rathenau 
(1867–1922), a German business executive of center-left political leanings 
who believed that Germany’s capitalism should be improved by giving 
workers a voice in corporate governance so that managers would consider 
workers’ interests rather than just those of shareholders.87 From 1915, 
Rathenau served as chairman of the Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft 
(AG), the electrical goods firms his father had founded; a position that 
allowed him to play an important role in Germany’s war effort and the 
political transformation that followed the Kaiser’s abdication. Rathenau, 
who strived to create a social-democratic and republican Germany, was 
assassinated in 1922 by right-wing German nationalists who wrongly 
assumed that his Jewishness meant that he sympathized with the new 
Bolshevik regime in Russia.88 In their conclusion, Berle and Means discuss 
Rathenau’s late-1918 book Von Kommenden Dingen,89 where Rathenau 
argued that managers should liberate them from the control of 
shareholders, which would thus allow them to share profits with workers.90 
Rathenau’s writings on the future of capitalism, which were shaped 
by his wartime experiences, influenced Berle and Means. Berle and Means 
were, like Rathenau, attempting to understand how the First World War 
had transformed capitalism while simultaneously thinking about how it 
could be reformed into a more humane and just system. The First World 
War and its socioeconomic impact is a major theme in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property. Although the authors discuss the U.S. 
Civil War, which they appear to regard as a turning point in business 
history,91 they are more interested in the legacies of the First World War 
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and the social and ethical questions it raised. For instance, the authors refer 
to the impact of the outbreak of the European war in 1914, which raised 
demand for steel on American steel companies, in the course of discussing 
the obligation of business executives.92 The authors also discuss how 
wealthy Americans attempted to shield their dividend incomes in response 
to the “heavy surtaxes on large incomes during the [First World] War and 
the post-war period.”93 
Berle and Means argue that this war helped to democratize the 
ownership of corporate stocks, which previously had been owned by a 
small group of wealthy Americans who had come to be much more 
dispersed by the conclusion of the conflict in 1919. In their account, the 
nature of American capitalism was changed profoundly during the 
relatively brief period; the U.S. was a belligerent nation. Although Berle 
and Means were open to the possibility that the advent of mass 
shareholding during the Great War might be reversed in the future, they 
said it was more likely that the wartime dispersal in the ownership of 
corporate equity represented a “permanent change in the ownership of 
industrial wealth comparable to the shift in landownership which was an 
outgrowth of the French Revolution.”94 
Berle and Means analogize business activity with military service 
while arguing against the “individual liberty” advocated by Adam Smith. 
Whereas the enterprises of Smith’s era consisted of “an individual or a few 
partners[,] . . . today we have tens and hundreds of thousands of owners, 
of workers and of consumers combined in single enterprises.”95 The rise 
of these large organizations meant that “individual initiative” would 
largely disappear: “[T]he idea that an army operates on the basis of 
‘rugged individualism’ would be ludicrous. Equally so is the same idea 
with respect to the modern corporation.”96 Berle and Means had realized 
that the corporation was not just an economic institution but also a social 
one, embodying a wide range of interpersonal relationships contextualized 
by power, in a similar fashion to the military. 
Neither Berle nor Means was a socialist, and they almost certainly 
detested the Bolshevik regime that came to power in late 1917. However, 
the analysis of corporate governance in their book was grounded in an 
interpretation of history that follows Marxism in holding that conflict 
between different layers of societies and organizations is a universal 
constant and a primary motor of historical change. They note that the 
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current struggle over control of America’s great business corporations is 
just the latest iteration of a perennial issue: “a constant warfare has existed 
between the individuals wielding power, in whatever form, and the 
subjects of that power,” with the latter group wanting to ensure that power 
is “the servant of the bulk of the individuals it affects.”97 It was in that 
context that Berle and Means referred to the College of Cardinals in the 
Catholic Church.98 In analyzing recent struggles to control U.S. 
companies, they used military language and metaphors. For instance, 
Berle and Means use words such as “fight,” “battle,” and “open warfare” 
when referring to the use of proxy votes in 1929 by John D. Rockefeller, 
Jr. to oust Colonel Robert W. Stewart as chairman of Standard Oil 
Company of Indiana.99 
Although the worldview expressed by Berle and Means in The 
Modern Corporation is similar to that of Marxism in that it posits that 
social conflict is a universal constant, their approach differs from 
Marxism, which issues confident predictions about the future. Berle and 
Means evidently disagree with the Marxist concept of historical 
inevitability, and as a result, their book is characterized by intellectual 
modesty and a sense of historical contingency. Berle and Means confess 
that it is not yet clear to them what “position in the community” America’s 
“princes of industry” will eventually acquire.100 They note that while other 
authors regard the current socioeconomic order “plutocracy” as “a 
transition phase towards ultimate socialism or communism,” it was too 
soon to venture a firm conclusion about how the existing system would 
evolve.101 Similarly, they declare that “it is not possible to predict” with 
absolutely certainty that the trend towards corporate concentration would 
continue since the annual rate of concentration was varied in recent 
years.102 To reinforce their claim that future prediction was challenging, 
they point out the concentration rate in “1921 through 1923” slowed, 
which may have been “a breathing spell after the excessive growth of the 
war years.”103 In other words, the rate of corporate consolidation was not 
destined to accelerate forever. However, they are reasonably confident that 
“the great corporation, already of tremendous importance today, will 
become increasingly important in the future.”104 
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The references to the Great War in The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property are not surprising, for we know that the conflict did 
indeed contribute to the dispersion of share ownership, as Julia Ott has 
recently demonstrated.105 During the war, the federal income tax, which 
had been introduced in 1913 following the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment, became significantly more progressive.106 To maintain the 
support of union leaders such as Samuel L. Gompers for military 
conscription, the Wilson administration had agreed to an excess profits tax 
that effectively conscripted wealth.107 In the United States, as in wartime 
Europe, military conscription on a massive scale resulted in the 
introduction of progressive forms of taxation that ensured that older 
wealthy men shared the burden with the young and physically fit men who 
were compelled to join the military: as Scheve and Stasavage have 
observed in their study of Western tax regimes since 1900,108 progressive 
taxation and the militarization of societies tends to go hand in hand. 
We certainly see this broader pattern at work in the United States 
during the First World War, when wartime rhetoric disparaged profit-
seeking in favor of patriotism. During this conflict, wealthy industrialists 
who were too old to serve in uniform agreed to serve in the public sector 
as “Dollar-a-Year Men,” while wealthy investors were implored to invest 
in low-yield government securities during war bond drives.109 In other 
words, the pursuit of economic self-interest was to be suspended for the 
duration of hostilities. In discussing the popularity of the service ideal in 
this era of American society, David M. Kennedy noted that “few words 
were so widely bruited in American society in the World War I era as 
‘service’ . . . the wide currency of the term ‘service’ reflected the . . . 
historical phase through which American society was then passing.”110 
Contemporaries ranging from Walter Lippman to Herbert Hoover believed 
that the country was “negotiating a passage between individualistic and 
collective era.”111 
While U.S. battlefield casualties in the First World War were 
relatively light, the economic impact of the war was significant, as 
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economic historians have demonstrated.112 The transformative impact of 
the Great War on American business helps to explain why Berle and 
Means discuss this conflict frequently in a book published fourteen years 
after the armistice. Furthermore, the war years witnessed Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co., in which Ford’s shareholders sued the industrialist on the 
grounds of insufficient dividends. This court case, which was discussed in 
the book,113 prompted widespread reflection about whether the non-
shareholder stakeholders had a moral claim to the share of the profits made 
by corporations. Henry Ford had attempted to run his company in keeping 
with a variant of a stakeholder theory of corporate governance, albeit one 
that saw no role for organized labor. Nevertheless, the courts ruled that 
this practice was a breach of Ford’s fiduciary duty to his shareholders.114 
VI. THE DECLINING INFLUENCE OF THE BERLE–MEANS VISION  
OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP AS PUBLIC SERVICE AFTER 1970 
As we have seen, Berle and Means were calling on top managers to 
selflessly disregard their pecuniary interests and those of shareholders so 
that they could serve a wider range of stakeholders, including workers, 
consumers, and crucially, the nation-state. Berle and Means outlined a 
vision of corporate governance in which business executives behaved like 
the army officers who risk life and limb not for profit but to serve the 
national interest. The book by Berle and Means went through many U.S. 
editions in the postwar-period, and it also influenced thinking in other 
countries via its translations into German, French, Japanese, Italian, and 
other languages.115 Moreover, Berle and Means’s vision of business 
executives who were motivated by public service rather than simple profit 
maximization was echoed by other popular business books of the postwar 
era, such as the 1958 bestseller The Capitalist Manifesto by Louis Kelso 
and Mortimer Adler, as well as Howard Bowen’s 1953 book The Social 
Responsibilities of the Businessman and Morrell Heald’s The Social 
Responsibilities of Business, Company, and Community, 1900-1960.116 
                                                     
 112. Michael J. Greenwood & Zachary Ward, Immigration Quotas, World War I, and Emigrant 
Flows from the United States in the Early 20th Century, EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST., Jan. 2015, at 
76; Hugh Rockoff, Until It’s Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War I (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10580, 2004). 
 113. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 41, at 190, 261. 
 114. Henderson, supra note 19. 
 115. Letter from Haruzo Kaneko to Adolf Berle (1951) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library, Adolf Berle Papers, Box 181, File: The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
Correspondence, 1949–1970). 
 116. Stefan J. Padfield, The Inclusive Capitalism Shareholder Proposal, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. 
J. 147 (2017). 
2019] Military Roots of a Stakeholder Model  559 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Berle and Means’s vision influenced the 
culture of corporate America: in this period, most managers explicitly 
rejected the idea of shareholder primacy and declared their firms existed 
to serve a wide range of stakeholders, including workers.117 However, 
starting in the 1970s, the political and business cultures of the United 
States shifted away from the ethos espoused by Berle and Means. The key 
player in the realm of ideas who contributed to this shift was the neoliberal 
economist and public intellectual Milton Friedman, who famously 
declared that the “one and only one social responsibility of business” was 
to maximize profits for shareholders.118 Friedman promoted such 
neoliberal ideas in his academic work at the University of Chicago, his 
Newsweek column and television documentaries, and in the advice he 
gave personally to U.S. Presidents and world leaders.119 The end of the 
draft in 1974 was strongly supported by Friedman and other neoliberals 
who wanted a more market-oriented approach to military recruitment.120 
The neoliberal belief that firms should maximize profits as much as 
the law allows is fundamentally similar to the ethos that says that military 
service should be structured like any other employment market in which 
self-interested, rational actors participate. In both cases, it is assumed that 
everyone is self-interested and there are no appeals to patriotism or any 
other form of altruism. The end of military conscription, which was a 
crucial early victory for the neoliberal project,121 can therefore be linked 
to the cultural trends that contributed to the rise of the ideology of 
shareholder value in the 1980s and 1990s, a period when U.S. managers 
returned to the early twentieth century view that the sole purpose of a 
corporation was to promote shareholder value.122 The ideology of 
shareholder value was promoted among the U.S. business elite by 
Professor Michael Jensen, who joined the faculty of HBS in 1984 and 
aggressively promoted this vision of how companies ought to be governed 
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in his influential publications and the MBA classroom.123Although 
influential, Milton Friedman and Michael Jensen promoted ideas that were 
diametrically opposed to the citizen–soldier ethos promoted by Berle and 
Means. 
Another public intellectual who influenced U.S. business culture in 
a fashion that undermined the public-service ethos promoted by Berle and 
Means was Ayn Rand, a thinker who had a profound impact on U.S. 
politics and culture despite never having an institutional affiliation.124 
Although only a small minority of business and political leaders have 
openly identified themselves as followers of this self-employed 
philosopher, her absolutist defense of free markets and the pursuit of self-
interest has had a well-documented influence on U.S. business culture and 
on the thinking of U.S. CEOs in industries ranging from energy to retail.125 
Prominent CEOs who have acknowledged Rand’s influence on their 
thinking include Rex Tillerson of ExxonMobil, Andy Pudzer of the fast-
food group CKE Restaurants, and John A. Allison IV, CEO of BB&T and 
subsequent head of Washington’s Cato Institute.126 Ayn Rand wrote that 
each individual ought to pursue “his own rational self-interest, none 
sacrificing himself or others . . . . This is the opposite of what the word 
‘service’ means.”127 Although Rand never directly attacked the 
publications of Berle and Means, her ideas were clearly incompatible with 
their philosophy of corporate governance. 
The results of the displacement of the Berle–Means vision of how 
companies ought to be governed with Friedman and Jensen’s shareholder 
value ideology has produced a range of negative consequences for U.S. 
business and society. The adoption by U.S. business leaders of shareholder 
value ideology resulted in a wave of ruthless downsizing of the type 
pioneered by GE’s Jack Welch, the development of a short-termist 
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approach to corporate decision-making, reduced spending on corporate 
R&D, and growing economic inequality both within firms and the wider 
society.128 
CONCLUSION 
We interpret The Modern Corporation and Private Property as an 
attempt by the authors to introduce to the business world the ethos of 
disinterested public service that characterizes the officer corps of the U.S. 
military. In effect, Berle and Means were calling on top managers to 
selflessly disregard their pecuniary interests and those of shareholders so 
that they could serve a wider range of stakeholders, including workers, 
consumers, and, crucially, the nation-state. Berle and Means outlined a 
vision of corporate governance in which business executives behaved like 
the army officers who risk life and limb not for profit but to serve the 
national interest. Our paper has suggested the Berle and Means’s vision of 
corporate executives who altruistically serve the national interest was 
informed by the example of military officers who patriotically serve the 
national interest in return for modest salaries. We would therefore suggest 
that the managerialist/stakeholder philosophy of Berle and Means can be 
associated with the militarization of U.S. society, a process that 
accelerated during the First World War and which had a profound impact 
on both of the book’s authors. 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property played an important 
role in debates about the social purposes of U.S. corporations during and 
after the New Deal. As other authors have noted, the public service ethos 
that Berle and Means promoted in the book was dominant in U.S. business 
culture until about 1980, when a new generation of business leaders and 
intellectuals resurrected the idea that the sole purpose of a corporation is 
to maximize shareholder value.129 By the 1990s, shareholder value 
ideology was hegemonic in U.S. business culture, and it has had a 
significant impact on business decision-making.130 
However, a single book, no matter how eloquent and thoroughly 
researched, cannot shift the business culture of an entire nation. The 
research of Cheffins suggests that the ideas of Berle and Means had such 
a great influence on U.S. business because they were congruent with the 
ethos of public service that was inculcated in U.S. business leaders of the 
so-called Greatest Generation during the Second World War. Cheffins’s 
insight raises the counterfactual question of whether the ideas of Berle and 
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Means would have resonated with so many U.S. business leaders of the 
Greatest Generation had the United States not experienced mass 
mobilization, and the associated political and culture transformations, after 
1941.131 
Some scholars who research economic inequality subscribe to Walter 
Scheidel’s theory that economic inequality in capitalist societies is only 
likely to fall during and immediately after major war and other 
catastrophic episodes of violence.132 The casual mechanism said to link 
mass military mobilization and greater economic inequality is that 
universal military service is thought to promote norms that encourage the 
more egalitarian distribution of wealth.133 Scheidel’s theory is congruent 
with the observed behavior of U.S. businesses in the three decades after 
1945, when the managers of U.S. corporations allowed workers and other 
non-shareholder stakeholders to share in the benefits of rising productivity 
to a degree that looks generous in retrospect.134 Combining Scheidel’s 
theory with the research presented in this paper helps us to identify a 
direction for future research, namely historical research to determine how 
precisely the legacies of wartime mobilization interacted with the ideas 
presented by Berle and Means to help produce the public-spirited business 
culture of the United States in the three decades after 1945. Such research 
might involve comparing the words and actions of post-war business 
leaders who had served in uniform with those who did not. Another 
possible research avenue leading from this paper would be to investigate 
the reception of Berle and Means’s book outside of the United States. 
We believe that the arguments that Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means 
articulated are still germane to policy discussions. There are, of course, 
important differences between the historical context in which this book 
was written (i.e., the end of the Roaring Twenties) and the present, and 
some striking parallels exist, including high rates of income inequality and 
widespread dissatisfaction with the prevailing shareholder-centric theory 
of corporate governance. In our view, the relevance of the ideas of Berle 
and Means is illustrated by an episode from the 2016 presidential election, 
when Hillary Clinton called for more “corporate patriotism.” 
Campaigning in Detroit in March 2016, Clinton criticized the outsourcing 
of U.S. manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries: “The idea of corporate 
patriotism might sound quaint in era of vast multinationals, but it’s the 
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right thing to do.”135 In her speech to the July 2016 Democratic National 
Convention, Clinton once again called on American corporations to begin 
acting in a more “patriotic” fashion: “I believe American corporations that 
have gotten so much from our country should be just as patriotic in 
return.”136 In a piece of political theatre, Clinton’s call for a “New 
Bargain” between corporations and American workers was delivered after 
a series of uniformed military speakers had warmed up the audience. The 
juxtaposition of symbols of military service with a discussion of corporate 
greed subtly challenged shareholder value ideology, i.e., the view that the 
sole purpose of a company is to make money for its worldwide shareholder 
base.137 
As we have shown, Berle and Means believed that just as male 
citizens of a democracy have a duty to perform military service, the 
managers of corporations must also seek to promote the commonwealth 
rather than exclusively their own interests or those of the shareholders. At 
a time when Americans are once again debating issues related to corporate 
governance, executive compensation, and whether managers have duties 
beyond maximizing returns for shareholders, thinking about the historical 
origins of Berle and Means’s text is timely. It may be that Hillary Clinton’s 
corporate patriotism concept is resurrected by future political leaders. The 
public service ethos that shaped Berle and Means appears to be less 
prevalent than it was when The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
was published. However, Berle and Means wrote about a problem—
control of corporations—that continues to have enormous public policy 
implications. They still have much to contribute to discussions of 
corporate power, ownership, and who gets to shape the role of corporations 
in society. 
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